Advances in Clinical Medical Research and Healthcare Delivery
Volume 1

Issue 3

Article 12

2021

The Challenge of Preventing a Rare but Potentially Devastating Iatrogenic Exposure to
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: An Ambi-directional Observation with Policy
Intervention
Ritambhara Pandey
Ritambhara.Pandey@rochesterregional.org
Devesh Rai
Devesh.Rai@rochesterregional.org
Julie Giles
Julie.Giles@rochesterregional.org
MaryRose Laguio-Vila
Rochester Regional Health System, maryrose.laguiovila@rochesterregional.org
Emil Lesho
Rochester Regional Health System, carolinelesho@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.rochesterregional.org/advances
Part of the Infectious Disease Commons

Recommended Citation
Pandey R, Rai D, Giles J, Laguio-Vila M, Lesho E. The Challenge of Preventing a Rare but Potentially Devastating
Iatrogenic Exposure to Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: An Ambi-directional Observation with Policy Intervention.
Advances in Clinical Medical Research and Healthcare Delivery. 2021; 1(3). doi: 10.53785/2769-2779.1032.
ISSN: 2769-2779
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by RocScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Advances in Clinical Medical Research and Healthcare Delivery by an authorized editor of RocScholar. For more
information, please contact Advances@rochesterregional.org.

The Challenge of Preventing a Rare but Potentially Devastating Iatrogenic
Exposure to Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: An Ambi-directional Observation
with Policy Intervention
Abstract
Although rare, patients with variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in their differential diagnosis of
progressive dementia and movement disorder could continue to present to hospitals for care. However,
U.S.-based infection control guidelines do not fully address the possibility of vCJD. After near-misses
involving increasing numbers of patients with clinical findings and epidemiologic risks compatible with
vCJD, or exposures to chronic wasting disease, we sought to improve recognition and prevention of
iatrogenic spread of these prion-related diseases.
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Introduction
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) are progressively fatal
neurodegenerative diseases caused by infectious, misshapen prion proteins (PrPSc). In humans,
they include variant and classic (or sporadic) Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD/sCJD), the latter
being far more common in the U.S. TSEs present substantial diagnostic, infection control, and
patient notification challenges. (Table 1). For example, because prions resist usual standard
disinfection and sterilization protocols, iatrogenic exposures can occur via contaminated
instruments or equipment. Iatrogenic TSE can also be transmitted by percutaneous exposure to
certain types of tissue (mostly neural for sCJD), while vCJD can also be transmitted by exposure
to infected lymphoid tissue and possibly blood transfusions. This is why people from regions
where TSE was prevalent were precluded from donating blood.1-3
However, U.S.-based cleaning and disinfection and control guidelines and updates do not
address the possibility of vCJD.4, 5 Those guidelines do, however, recommend heightened
awareness and policy modification as events dictate.4, 5 Additionally, experts have noted persistent
risk of TSEs other than sCJD in unsuspected geographic locations and a need for heightened
suspicion and surveillance.6, 7 Furthermore, surveys of lymphoid tissue where PrPsc is found in
cases of vCJD, suggest the prevalence of asymptomatic disease can be as high as 1 in 2,000 in
persons born between 1941 and 1985.8
Two Illustrative Incidents
Two incidents typified the challenges we faced in caring for these and similar patients and
provided the impetus for this approach. The first incident involved a patient who presented with
memory problems, apathy and depression leading to job loss. These symptoms were followed by
confusion, impaired gait, occasional jerking movements and eventually dementia. The patient
lived in England and France from 1985 to 1993 and ate canned dog food occasionally. The patient
also required urgent pelvic and abdominal surgery immediately after admission. MRI showed
restricted diffusion in the frontal, parietal, and occipital cortexes. 14-3-3, and Tau protein were
negative. Since immune mediated encephalitis was also a leading consideration on the list of
possible diagnoses, the patient underwent plasma exchange. Then, 13 days later, the real-time
quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) result became available and was positive. Contact tracing
revealed that in the meantime, three other patients had undergone pheresis on the same machine.
The Red Cross was contacted and recommended decommissioning the machine until further
notice. The dilemma of patient notification was debated by the ethics, risk management, infection
control team and the hospital leaders.
The second incident involved a middle-aged patient who presented with psychiatric
symptoms and cognitive decline. The patient, who was an avid hunter and consumed venison and
squirrel brains, also developed impaired gait. An MRI showed bilateral pulvinar signs. The EEG
did not reveal periodic sharp waves, but showed nonspecific abnormalities including intermittent
rhythmic delta activity. The patient required several diagnostic and therapeutic procedures
including endoscopies and endotracheal intubation that entailed exposure to lymphoid tissue.
Approximately two weeks after admission, 14-3-3, Tau protein, and RT-QuIC results became
available and were positive, creating a dilemma for reprocessing critical and semi-critical
equipment. After several months in the hospital, the patient was discharged to a long-term care
facility, and died more than 11 months after symptom onset. vCJD could not be definitively
excluded until autopsy results became available several months later and revealed sCJD. Table 1
highlights some of the challenges associated with TSE.
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Table 1: Diagnostic, Infection Control, and Notification Challenges Associated with
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Diagnostic Challenge
A. Most clinicians are unfamiliar with TSEs due to the rarity of those diseases.
B. vCJD and CJD can be hard to distinguish clinically.
C. No gold standard laboratory test exists for differentiating types of TSEs.
D. Turn-around-time for RT-QuIC can be up to 14 days or longer.
E. In some cases, definitive diagnosis requires brain biopsy or only becomes available
after autopsy.
F. The National Prion Center typically only releases autopsy results to public health
departments, furthering delay.
Infection Control Challenges
A. Prions resist usual disinfection and sterilization methods.
B. US-based disinfection and sterilization guidelines do not address possibility of vCJD
contaminated equipment.
Notification Challenges or Considerations
A. Should potentially exposed patients be informed given the below considerations?
i. Potential negative impact of informing patients about a fatal, untreatable
brain disease.
ii. No effective screening test is available for TSE.
iii. No post exposure prophylaxis is available.
iv. Contaminated instruments often become mixed during re-processing making
identification and linkage to specific patients nearly impossible.
v. Autoclaving is generally superior to chemical reprocessing for prions.
vi. If equipment was re-processed more than twice, prions would be less likely to
survive.
Against this backdrop, we sought to enhance our efforts to detect and prevent iatrogenic
spread of TSE, including vCJD. We also aimed to increase awareness among all providers, prevent
over-reaction or unnecessarily discarding expensive equipment, while simultaneously not missing
an opportunity to prevent avoidable exposures.
Setting
The health system consists of 8 hospitals and 9 urgent care centers in St Lawrence County,
and the 9 counties comprising the Finger Lakes region of NY. The system serves diverse
populations including refugee communities and permanent or temporarily relocated citizens or
expatriates from many countries.
Methods
The study consisted of a four-year ambi-directional observation of patients with suspected
or confirmed CJD, with a two-component intervention at the midpoint (01/01/2017). Patients who
had a laboratory order for 14-3-3 or RT-QuIC were included. The first part of the intervention
entailed an educational campaign nearly identical to the one successfully used for device-related
infections and described previously.9 The second part of the intervention involved extensive
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revision of our existing CJD policy, incorporating guidelines from the UK Department of Health
and Social Care Advisory Committee and the World Health Organization regarding vCJD.10, 11
Briefly, the educational campaign included one-on-one engagements between infection
preventionists (IPs), the hospital epidemiologist, the neurologist champion and frontline nurses
and providers. Modes of delivery included individual face-to-face meetings, team huddles,
committee meetings, group lectures and grand rounds. Relevant guidelines were posted on hospital
websites and intranet.
The policy and attendant protocols were revised based on input from the neurology,
laboratory and sterile processing departments One goal of the policy revision was early notification
of all teams involved in the care including physicians, nursing staff including laboratory and sterile
processing. Another goal was a simplified classification scheme of potentially infected tissue.
Tissues were divided into three categories depending on their risk of infectivity: high, low, and no
detectable infectivity (Table 2). Only single use or disposable instruments are recommended for
suspected cases who undergo surgery or invasive procedures involving contact with other than
“no-risk” tissues. Non-disposable instruments or durable medical equipment that contact other
than no risk tissues should be quarantined for possible decommissioning with appropriate labeling.
All instruments are considered potentially contaminated when used on patients with conditions not
clearly diagnosed before the procedure, and those instruments are either reprocessed according to
prion guidelines or quarantined until the diagnosis is confirmed.
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Table 2: Infectivity of Specific Types of Tissue
High
Infectivity
Tissue

Low
Infectivity
Tissue

Classic/ Sporadic CJD
Brain (including dura mater)
Spinal cord
Posterior eye
Pituitary tissue
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF)
Liver
Lymph node
Kidney
Lung (Bronchoscope)
Spleen
Placenta
Olfactory epithelium

Variant CJD
Brain (including dura mater)
Spinal cord, spinal ganglia
Posterior eye
Pituitary tissue
Trigeminal ganglia
Adrenal gland
Blood
Tonsils (Laryngoscope)
Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF)
Intestine (Endoscope)
Bone marrow
Liver
Lymph node
Kidney
Lung (Bronchoscope)
Spleen
Skeletal muscle
Placenta
Olfactory epithelium
Peripheral nerves
Rectum (Endoscope)
Thyroid gland
Heart
Adipose tissue
Gingiva
Prostate and testis
Tears, sweat, saliva, and
sputum
Urine and feces
Semen and vaginal
secretions
Breast milk

Reprocessing
NO
reprocessing
allowed*

NO
reprocessing
allowed*

Tissue with no Peripheral nerve
OK to reprocess
detectable
Intestine
infectivity
Bone marrow
Whole blood, leukocytes,
serum, and plasma
Thyroid gland
Adrenal gland
Heart
Skeletal muscle
Adipose tissue
Gingiva
Prostate and testis
Tears, sweat, saliva, and
sputum
Urine and feces
Semen and vaginal
secretions
Breast milk
Note: *Applies to surgical instruments and certain invasive equipment such as endoscopes and
laryngoscope blades

Results
During the two-year retrospective review there were an annual average of 13 requests for
processing spinal fluid for CJD. The average annual number of such patients for the two-year
prospective follow-up surveillance after the intervention was 25. During that follow-up period no
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similar incidents or other near misses. Specifically, there was no incorrect reprocessing of
instruments or inadvertent re-use of durable equipment that was potentially contaminated. In
response to queries from other IPs and epidemiologists, the policy was shared with hospitals
outside of the network. Feedback was uniformly positive.
Discussion
TSEs present diagnostic, infection control and patient notification challenges. Most
clinicians are unfamiliar with TSEs due to the rarity of those diseases. vCJD and CJD can be hard
to distinguish clinically. No gold standard laboratory test exists for differentiating types of TSEs.
The turn-around-time for RT-QuIC can be up to 14 days or longer. In some cases, definitive
diagnosis requires brain biopsy or only becomes available after autopsy. Last, the National Prion
Center typically only releases autopsy results to public health departments, furthering diagnostic
delay.
This approach could be criticized for not being warranted or justifiable due to the fact vCJD
is extraordinarily uncommon. Even though sCJD is far more common than vCJD in the U.S.,
patients with suspected vCJD have been increasingly encountered in our health system. The
suspicion was based on epidemiologic exposures and symptoms or signs consistent with vCJD.
For example, having lived in the United Kingdom or France for several years or decades, or
occupational exposure as taxidermists or abattoirs, or regular consumption of animal brains or
cervid meat products. Furthermore, available data indicate that the incidence of CJD in cervids is
increasing, and the potential exists for transmission to humans and subsequent human disease, and
the species barrier is not static.7 These occurrences are unlikely to be unique to our healthcare
system. To that end, we make our policy to those interested. It is available from the corresponding
author upon request.
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